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Introduction: CommonCivility –
International Criminal Law
as Cultural Hybrid
ELIES VAN SLIEDREGT∗
On 28 and 29 October 2011, a conference was held in The Hague on International
Criminal Law (ICL) as a cultural and legal hybrid. The aim of the conference con-
venors was to facilitate an exchange of thoughts between legal scholars, practition-
ers, and social scientists on the nature of ICL and to discuss the role (legal) culture
plays in international criminal justice. The recent discussion is dominated by the
adversarial (common law)–inquisitorial (civil law) dichotomy and centres on the
hybridnature of theprocedure in international criminal law.1 Thedebate focuses on
howa fair andefﬁcient trial canbesafeguardedbyobserving the rightsof theaccused
and other participants through an operational criminal procedure. Sometimes, this
clash of legal systems has become an end in itself, resulting in a debate on which
system is superior. At least in theory, however, modern international criminal pro-
cedural law seems to have overcome the adversarial–inquisitorial dichotomy, since
it combines features of both common- and civil-law systems.2 This unique com-
promise structure poses a challenge to the practitioners who – although trained
in and inﬂuenced by their respective national systems – have to apply the proced-
ural norms at the international level and, in doing so, ﬁnd an appropriate balance
between adversarial and inquisitorial features. This is even more challenging since
the single elements of the different legal traditions do not ﬁt together seamlessly,
leading to myriad, heated disagreements over how to combine them into a single,
coherent, workable legal system.
The main objective of the conference is to explore the background and con-
sequences of the civil law–common law conﬂict, to disclose how it affects the daily
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functioning of international tribunals, establishwhich tensions arise from the com-
bination of features from the different legal systems, and to discuss how theymight
best be resolved. The conference convenors wish to bring the discussion on legal
culture and ICL a step further and see whether there are ways to overcome the
common law–civil law divide. It is also felt that the concept of culture should be
looked at in a broaderway, as encompassingnotions ofWestern versus non-Western
culture, of North versus South, and by questioning the universality claim of inter-
national criminal justice. The speakers and participants dealt with the following
questions:
1. What have been the respective contributions of civil law versus common law to
the recent development of international criminal law?
2. Why have international criminal courts and drafters of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court chosen to adopt common-law approaches to certain
issues but civil-law ones on other matters?
3. How does culture play a role in international criminal trials where defendants
fromone culture are adjudicated by judges from another culture? Should there be
more culture sensitivity on the part of international judges and prosecutors, and,
if so, why?
4. Why did the current competition overwhose lawwould be incorporated into ICL
come to be so widely understood as one of common law versus civil law lawyers,
rather than, say, North versus South (as would surely have occurred in the 1960s
and 1970s), formal versus customary, or any number of other possible axes of
contention?
5. How do lawyers initially trained in one legal culture respond to the challenges of
workplace environments at international and hybrid tribunals, where they must
collaborate professionally with lawyers trained in the other legal culture? How
have such encounters –with their attendantmiscommunications and sometimes
heated disagreements – shaped the intellectual development of this burgeoning
new ﬁeld?
Thesetopicscannotbediscussedadequatelyfromapurelylegalpointofview.Accord-
ingly, the conference was based on a multidisciplinary approach to the disciplines
of international criminal law, public international law, legal anthropology, and so-
ciology of law. The speakers and participants consisted of legal scholars, judges, and
social scientists from different countries. In order to guarantee a truly ‘universal’
cross-cultural exchange of thoughts, the organizers also invited experts from legal
traditions that have been neglected in the discussion so far, such as representatives
of Islamic countries.
A selection of the papers presented at the conferencewill be published in a series
in this journal. The ﬁrst two papers that will be published relate to the hybrid
and Western nature of ICL. In the ﬁrst paper, Bohlander queries the inter-model
conversation (common law versus civil law) that is ongoing in ICL and poses the
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question as to whether it is not necessary to hold this discussion at a much more
fundamental level thanhas been the case so far. Bohlander does sowith the example
of the relationship between German and English law. Badar, in his paper, discusses
the reception of the ICC Statute in Islamic states. He further compares the Rome
Statute to the principles of Islamic law to see whether the latter reﬂects the norms
and standards enshrined in the Rome Statute.
